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 Some Thoughts on Appellate 
Advocacy in Constitutional Cases 
Mr. Justice Robert G. Richards 
I was told that my friend Professor Jamie Cameron would be 
introducing me today. That caused me to reflect on the year she and I 
clerked together at the Supreme Court. As Jamie mentioned, I worked 
for Justice Ronald Martland. At the time, he was the ranking puisne 
judge. By virtue of his seniority, he had the premium corner office: very 
spacious, high ceiling, over-stuffed red leather furniture, wood-panelled 
walls. As I recall, he had only two things on those walls. The first was 
cheaply framed a picture of his wife. The second, prominently 
displayed, was a New Yorker style cartoon. I liked that cartoon a good 
deal and thought it quite wonderful that a judge who had been on the 
Supreme Court of Canada for over 20 years would hang it in his office.  
When I was appointed to the Court of Appeal, I decided to copy 
Justice Martland. It took considerable effort to track down the cartoon 
but I was ultimately successful. It now sits proudly on a shelf in my 
office where it can’t be missed. It features two very ordinary looking 
middle-aged men in business suits. One of them is saying to the other 
“You know Ralph, this daily metamorphosis never ceases to amaze me. 
Around home I’m a perfect idiot. I can’t do anything right. But I come 
to work, put on a black robe, get behind the bench and by God I’m it!” 
I can assure you that the first part of that observation is correct — 
around home I am not infrequently a perfect idiot. Moreover, I suppose 
that if I receive many more introductions as generous as Jamie’s, I just 
might begin to think I’m “it” as well and thereby live out the full scope 
of Justice Martland’s cartoon. 
As many of you will know, the most famous lines in the literature 
on advocacy are the ones used by American lawyer John W. Davis over 
65 years ago. He compared lawyers to fly fishermen. The lawyer’s 
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challenge, according to Davis, is to devise arguments that attract and 
ultimately land judicial fish. He put it this way: 
[I]n the argument of an appeal the advocate is angling, concisely and 
deliberately angling, for the judicial mind. Whatever tends to attract 
judicial favour to the advocate’s claim is useful. Whatever repels it is 
useless or worse. The whole art of the advocate consists in choosing 
the one and avoiding the other. Why otherwise have argument at all?1 
As was explained, before my appointment to the Court of Appeal I 
spent some considerable time standing in the rivers of the law, wearing 
hip waders and throwing lines into the water — sometimes successfully; 
often times not. For the past 18 months, I have played the other role 
contemplated by the Davis metaphor. I have been under the water, 
trying to decide what to bite and what to ignore. I am pleased to accept 
the invitation to attend this excellent conference and to share some brief 
thoughts about appellate advocacy in constitutional cases based on my 
dual experience as both fisherman and fish.  
The prosecution of a constitutional appeal is, of course, not a 
species of lawyering separate and apart from the non-constitutional 
variety. Good advocacy is good advocacy. The approaches, techniques 
and skills which make a successful appellate counsel are readily 
transferable across fields of law.  
There have been many excellent presentations on the general 
business of how to present an appeal. The recent contributions of Justice 
Ian Binnie2 and of Justice John Laskin3 are particularly noteworthy and 
provide useful guidelines for any practitioner. The main points here are 
rather well known. With respect to factums, they include the need for 
clear thinking, broad research and careful writing. In relation to oral 
argument, the most frequently stressed ideas include the importance of 
preparation, the significance of setting the agenda at the outset and the 
ability to handle questions. I will not attempt to re-plough those fields in 
any comprehensive way by starting with the notice of appeal and 
working through to the appellant’s right of reply. 
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Rather, given the nature of this conference, I propose to focus on a 
few matters of particular significance for constitutional appeals. There 
are eight of them. I wish they were seamlessly linked together by some 
overarching theme or vision, but they are not. They are simply a basket 
of very practical points which strike me as being especially worthy of 
attention in constitutional cases. In presenting them, I will try to comply 
with the organizers’ request that I work in some personal war stories and 
otherwise do what I can to lower the intellectual tone of the meeting. 
What I have to say will be framed in broad brush terms. But, of 
course, there is no such thing as a rule of universal application in this 
field. Principles have to be adapted to the circumstances of particular 
cases. 
I. UNDERSTAND THE FORUM 
A constitutional issue can be dealt with at any one of three different 
rungs on the appellate ladder: (a) trial level superior courts (in the case 
of appeals on summary conviction matters under the Criminal Code and 
in some administrative law contexts), (b) courts of appeal, and (c) the 
Supreme Court of Canada. Appellate advocacy at these three levels is 
not a one size fits all operation. In broad terms, the typical superior 
court judge will tend to focus on the specific case before him or her and 
to see the assignment as applying precedents and reviewing for error. 
Developing and clarifying the law is not the central part of the job 
description. However, as a case moves up the appellate ladder, the 
emphasis changes. In a court of appeal, legal principles can take on 
considerable importance. At the level of the Supreme Court, the focus is 
on broad concepts and the development of the law.  
This means, of course, that an effective advocate has to shade his or 
her approach to fit the relevant appellate audience. A great pitch to a 
superior court judge may not be a great pitch to a court of appeal and a 
winning argument in a court of appeal may not be quite the right tack to 
take in the Supreme Court. Therefore, in developing and delivering 
submissions, it is important to be attuned to the level of court involved. 
In my experience, this is a point which is often overlooked. Just this 
week, a lawyer appearing before my Court in a Charter-based case was 
brandishing trial level decisions as if they were tablets from the mount. 
He had to be reminded that we were interested not just in what the law 
was, but in what the law should be.  
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II. CHARACTERIZE THE ISSUES 
Influencing the way in which courts perceive the basic nature of an 
appeal can be fundamental to the outcome of constitutional litigation 
and, as a result, this is a matter which warrants considerable attention.  
Let me refer to two cases which illustrate this point. In New 
Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of 
Assembly),4 a broadcaster was attempting to get its cameras into the 
Nova Scotia Legislative Assembly. It presented its case as purely a 
section 2(b), freedom of expression, affair. Various legislative bodies, 
including the Speakers of the Assemblies in Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan for whom I acted, characterized the case as being first 
and foremost about parliamentary privilege. This was a very different 
perspective which shifted the foundations of the appeal. In the end,  
the Supreme Court agreed with the legislative bodies and ruled against 
the broadcaster. 
R. v. Latimer5 is another case in point. Mr. Latimer ended his 
disabled daughter’s life out of a belief he was justified in doing so in 
order to spare her from other surgery and treatment. In the early going, 
all of the actors, including the Crown, accepted the premise that the case 
was about Mr. Latimer’s constitutional rights under the Charter. My 
clients were a number of disability rights groups. Through two trips to 
the Court of Appeal and one to the Supreme Court of Canada, we sought 
to portray the case as being fundamentally about the section 15 and 
section 7 rights of persons with disabilities. Over the course of the 
litigation, we were able to substantially adjust the lens through which 
the case was viewed.  
III. LOOK FOR WORKABLE MIDDLE GROUND 
An appeal presents a court with a problem to be solved. Most judges 
look for an answer which is fair to the parties, which is doctrinally 
sound and which does not unnecessarily foreclose future developments 
or refinements in the law.  
In broad terms, this means it is often unwise to take an aggressive 
position and dig in, refusing to consider the prospect of finding a 
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compromise position. That is so because the argument of a 
constitutional case is not the equivalent of a final offer salary arbitration 
— the system sometimes used in professional sports where the arbitrator 
must select either the player’s last offer or the team’s last offer. Appeal 
courts do not work that way. They are often attracted to the reasonable 
middle ground solution to a problem and are not obliged to take either 
the extreme view presented by the appellant or the perhaps equally 
extreme view argued by the respondent. As a result, it can sometimes be 
a winning strategy to lay out a compromise position for the court, rather 
than to hope the judges find it on their own. 
The Patriation Reference Case6 is a classic illustration of this 
approach. The question there, of course, was whether Ottawa could 
unilaterally obtain U.K. legislation patriating the Canadian Constitution. 
The standard provincial position was that Confederation consisted of a 
pact and that, under its terms, each province had to consent before the 
federal government could ask Westminster for change. This approach 
carried with it the real risk of national constitutional paralysis. The 
federal government’s position was, in a sense, equally extreme. It said 
that provincial consent was legally irrelevant and that it could go to 
Westminster, as the sole voice of Canada, if and when it chose to.  
Saskatchewan sought to highlight a middle ground. It developed the 
theory that the federal government did not need unanimous provincial 
consent but that it did need substantial consent. This had the effect of 
avoiding the straitjacket implicit in the positions of the other provinces 
but at the same time, of imposing some restraints on Ottawa’s authority 
and requiring it to work with the provinces. As you know, the 
Saskatchewan view was ultimately endorsed by the Supreme Court in its 
decision. So, in that case, provincial interests were ultimately well 
served by the decision to abandon the extreme position represented by 
standard theory. By illuminating the middle ground, Saskatchewan 
made it much easier for the Court to opt against the position advocated 
by Ottawa.7 
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IV. RIDE HERD ON INTERVENORS 
Intervenors are a fact of life in constitutional litigation. From the 
perspective of the bench, this phenomenon presents an interesting 
challenge. On the one hand, constitutional appeals typically raise 
questions of general importance which transcend the particular interests 
of the litigants and, as a result, it is often appropriate to give a wider 
constituency some voice in the appeal process. On the other hand, there 
is an obvious concern about opening the court room door so broadly that 
appeals are transformed into a sort of judicially supervised constituent 
assembly. 
Whatever view one takes of this issue, the root reality is obvious: 
intervenors can and often do play a powerful role in constitutional 
appeals. Because of this, they represent an aspect of the appellate 
process which should be actively managed by counsel. 
It is useful to begin thinking at the outset about the intervenors 
which might helpfully be involved in the case. A particular intervenor, 
for example, might be a welcome addition to the mix because it adds 
some fire power on the substantive side of the analysis. I have seen 
many cases where the principal parties have been assisted enormously 
by intervenors. Furthermore, regardless of the substance of the appeal, 
intervenors can also influence the flavour or dynamics of a case in 
subtle but important ways. In Reference re Provincial Electoral 
Boundaries (Sask.),8 I was counsel for Saskatchewan in a Charter case 
concerning the voting rights provisions in section 3 of the Charter. It 
involved a situation where the government of the day had been accused, 
in effect, of an unconstitutional gerrymander and the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal had declared the provincial electoral map to be invalid. 
In those circumstances, we were anxious to have as many Attorneys 
General as possible intervene on our side of the appeal. They turned out 
in force and their mere presence gave the proceedings a very different 
dynamic than they might have had if the case had been a parochial 
Saskatchewan affair. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Court 
of Appeal and read section 3 of the Charter very narrowly. 
In dealing with intervenors, it is also important to make appropriate 
submissions aimed at preventing the participation of those who might 
hurt the cause or, alternatively, to make submissions aimed at restricting 
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their participation by limiting or denying time for oral argument, 
requiring factums to be directed only at specific issues and so forth. All 
of that, of course, must be played out in the context of the rules and the 
culture of the particular court in issue.  
Once the roster of participants in an appeal is established and the 
terms of engagement are resolved, it is also extremely useful to be in 
touch early on with the intervenors. Conversations about the record, the 
issues and the theory of the case can help to avoid those “friendly fire” 
incidents where an intervenor ends up hurting the principal party that it 
allegedly supports. The same applies to the argument of the appeal. A 
telephone call or meeting in advance of the hearing may allow the 
parties and their respective supporting intervenors to sort out who might 
say what and to work around any kinks in their proposed submissions. 
Intervenors themselves should remember that they are specially 
invited guests at someone else’s party and that they have been asked to 
attend in the expectation they will add something of consequence to the 
proceedings. It is unwise to spend pages of factum or minutes of oral 
argument apprising the court of the good deeds and important cases the 
intervenor has been involved in over the years. “Political” speeches are 
not helpful and not particularly welcome. Get right down to business. 
Counsel for intervenors should make their submissions without 
repeating points which others have already made effectively. As well, 
counsel should remember to react to the evolving dynamics of the 
hearing. For example, an intervenor on the respondent’s side of the 
courtroom is in the generally enviable position of having listened to 
virtually the entire appeal and can take advantage of that fact by dealing 
directly with what have emerged as the key concerns or dimensions of 
the case. 
V. SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE 
Splitting the argument of an appeal between counsel is a practice not 
infrequently pursued in big cases and constitutional appeals often fit that 
description. Sometimes these divisions of labour seem quite sensible on 
the surface: “Chief Justice, I will take the first 30 minutes of our allotted 
time to handle the question of whether there is a breach of section 2(a) 
of the Charter; my associate will use the remaining 30 minutes of our 
time to deal with section 1 issues”. However, in my experience, this is 
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never a wholly successful strategy and it often creates significant 
problems.  
Dividing up the argument necessarily forces it into compartments. 
In the example I have just used, counsel has assumed that the court 
thinks the section 2(a) part of the case and the section 1 part warrant 
equal attention. This might be entirely wrong. The court might think 
section 2(a) is largely a done deal and that the real action — the issue on 
which the case will turn and on which it would like to spend the bulk of 
the hearing — is section 1. Moreover, the court might not be inclined to 
respect a neat division of labour. It might want to move back and forth 
between section 2(a) and section 1 rather than treating those two aspects 
of the case as watertight compartments. 
In addition, the lawyer who bats second in this sort of arrangement 
has to hope and pray that the colleague going first has the modesty and 
the good sense to actually wrap up and sit down after 30 minutes. Often 
that does not happen and the poor counsel speaking last is left to 
scramble through his or her part of the case in a fraction of the time 
originally mapped out. 
It may feel wonderfully democratic to divide the argument. 
Workload is shared; everyone gets their moment in the spotlight. 
However, the real objective is to win the appeal and, in my experience, 
splitting the advocacy role is generally counterproductive. 
VI. MANAGE LEGISLATIVE AND SOCIAL FACTS 
Legislative and social facts are potential hazards in constitutional cases. 
In the early days of the Charter, the rule seemed to be “anything goes”. 
In the first Supreme Court appeal I handled as Director of Constitutional 
Law — a case I inherited from my predecessor, the former Dean of this 
Law School and now MacPherson J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal 
— the Supreme Court was prepared to rely on the contents of newspaper 
articles exhibited to an affidavit for purposes of establishing the factual 
background justifying limits on Charter rights. On more than one 
occasion in those early days, I simply filed various studies, statistics and 
other materials with the courts in order to make out a section 1 argument 
or to assist in arguing that no Charter breach had occurred. Nobody 
cried foul.  
Some 20 years later, we have largely emerged from the realm of 
pure ad hoc-ery. A good deal of the Supreme Court’s recent initiative in 
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this regard has been led by Binnie J. As counsel for an intervener, I was 
able to watch safely from the sidelines in Public School Boards Assn. of 
Alberta v. Alberta (Attorney General)9 when he struck a collection of 
statistics and other materials included by the appellant in a book of 
authorities and warned against “bootlegging evidence in the guise of 
authorities”. In R. v. Malmo-Levine,10 writing with Gonthier J., he 
endorsed as “correct” the trial judge’s decision to take judicial notice of 
certain government reports and documents but to hear viva voce expert 
evidence on the more debatable aspects of the marijuana controversy. 
And, more recently, he authored the Court’s decision in R. v. Spence.11  
In Spence, the Court examined the extent to which legislative and 
social facts can be properly made the subject of judicial notice. It 
recognized that the rules in this regard must be somewhat elastic and 
said the closer the fact in question approaches the dispositive issue in 
the case, the more a court ought to insist on compliance with the so-
called gold standard criteria, i.e., the more it ought to insist that the fact 
be either (a) so notorious as not to be the subject of debate among 
reasonable persons, or (b) capable of immediate and accurate 
demonstration by resort to readily accessible sources of indisputable 
accuracy. This meant that, in Spence itself, the Court refused to take 
judicial notice of how and to what extent racial discrimination affects 
the behaviour of jurors, a question at the centre of that case.  
Significantly, in Spence, the Court also went out of its way to say 
that legislative and social facts should be established by expert 
testimony rather than by reliance on judicial notice when they relate to 
matters reasonably open to dispute. It pointedly said “litigants who 
disregard the suggestion proceed at some risk”.  
Thus, as can be seen, this area of the law is being regularized to 
some extent. However, it remains a tricky business for counsel. The best 
approach is no doubt a cautious one which heeds the Supreme Court’s 
advice.12  
                                                                                                            
9
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 76, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 845. 
10
 [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571. 
11
 [2005] S.C.J. No. 74, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 458. 
12
 Helpful background writings in this area include: Mahmud Jamal, “Legislative Facts in 
Charter Litigation: Where Are We Now?” (Third Annual Charter Conference, Ontario Bar 
Association, Toronto, October 15, 2004); Ian Binnie, “Judicial Notice: How Much is Too Much?” 
in Alan W. Bryant, Marie Henein & Janet A. Leiper, eds., The Law Society of Upper Canada 
Special Lectures 2003: The Law of Evidence (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2004), at 543. 
28 Supreme Court Law Review (2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
VII. CONTROL THE RECORD 
Constitutional litigation can put appeal courts in a difficult spot. The 
impact of decisions extends well beyond the litigants and yet, on the 
basis of the standard adversarial model, the litigants set and determine 
the record which drives the outcome of the appeal. Some judges have 
been very candid about their refusal to be held hostage by the parties’ 
sense of what is necessary to a fully informed decision. For example, in 
R. v. Sioui, Lamer C.J. said he was entitled to take judicial notice of 
various historical documents “whether my attention was drawn to them 
by the intervener or as the result of my personal research … The 
documents I cite all enable the Court, in my view, to identify more 
accurately the historical context essential to the resolution of this 
case”.13 
I expect many advocates have had the uneasy feeling that, following 
the argument of an appeal, the judges have gone back to their chambers 
and, paraphrasing millionaire Montgomery Burns from The Simpsons, 
cried “Unleash the law clerks!” This is very unnerving stuff for counsel 
as it runs counter to the adversarial model of litigation which is 
embedded in every lawyer’s bones.  
On the basis of my short 18 months on the bench, I can think of but 
one way to avoid these sorts of concerns and that is by generating a 
record which is sufficiently complete and to the point that the court does 
not feel it has to go beyond what has been presented to it. There is only 
one reason judges are drawn to reach outside the record which has been 
developed. The reason is that they are uncomfortable. They believe 
more information will allow them to make a stronger decision. So, 
although it may sound trite, counsel can largely avoid the risk of judges 
doing their own homework by the simple expedient of doing it for them. 
VIII. DEAL WITH COMPLEXITIES 
I need not remind this group that there are areas of Charter litigation 
which are quite involved. The section 1 analysis prescribed by Oakes14 
is one example. The approach to section 15 mandated by Law15 is 
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another. I expect that many of you have despaired at the task of having 
to shape an argument around those requirements. It is not always easy 
and, as a result, sometimes there is a tendency or temptation to take 
short cuts or to be somehow less complete or diligent or precise in those 
parts of a factum or argument than in others. I see this all the time. 
It is a mistake. Unless and until the jurisprudence changes, the rules 
of the game are the rules of the game not just for counsel but for judges 
as well. The more convincingly, clearly and completely that a court can 
be shown how to work through Oakes or Law or other complex lines of 
analysis, the more likely that path will be followed. Leaving a court to 
make its own way through the thicket involves an inevitable risk that it 
will come out in the wrong place.  
At the same time, however, counsel who might be troubled by the 
existing state of the law in some area and who have constructive views 
as to how it might be tweaked, modified or improved should not hide 
their light under a basket. Finding some appropriate way to lay out those 
ideas might create change. For example, being a government lawyer at 
the time, I thought the Oakes test as originally formulated imposed an 
impossible burden with respect to the justification of legislation in the 
social policy realm. The concerns in this regard raised in cases like 
Irwin Toy16 were presumably not unrelated to the Supreme Court’s 
decision to soften Oakes in its application to those kinds of problems. 
So, litigants should play the game as prescribed but, if they have a view 
as to how to improve the rules, they should lay them out. There might be 
a receptive audience.  
IX. THE MEANING OF LIFE 
Let me end by dealing with the questions which I expect have occurred 
to almost every lawyer who has donned robes and lugged a briefcase 
into an appeal court. Those questions often surface late at night after a 
disappointing loss. They are to this effect: Does any of it matter? Do 
lawyers count? Would the result have been any different if I had simply 
stayed in bed? Should I join a rock band and move to Tijuana? 
The practitioners in the audience may be happy to learn that, on the 
basis of my judicial experience to date, advocacy does make a 
difference. Life does have meaning. Indeed, I think life is particularly 
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meaningful for those lawyers who labour in the constitutional field. That 
is because constitutional cases provide especially interesting scope for 
competing characterizations of problems, because they involve complex 
social and legal policy issues and because their outcomes are, at least in 
relative terms, often indeterminate. There are simply more opportunities 
in constitutional cases than in non-constitutional ones for counsel to 
approach matters in ways which will impact bottom-line decisions. 
In more particular terms, I can confirm that factums, as indicated by 
received wisdom, are extremely important. It is easier to succeed in an 
appeal with a strong factum and a weak oral argument than to succeed 
with a weak factum and a strong oral argument. It is not glamorous, but 
the simple truth is that more appeals are won by the efforts of lawyers 
sitting on their backsides in the library writing factums than are won by 
the efforts of lawyers standing on their feet presenting oral arguments. 
The sweat which counsel invest in factums pays real dividends.  
That said, I certainly do not subscribe to the view that oral argument 
is of marginal or little consequence. It is not capable of tipping the 
balance where the result is clear. I have yet to encounter, either as 
lawyer or judge, counsel who could truly transform a sow’s ear into a 
silk purse. However, in close cases and in difficult cases, oral argument 
can make the difference. 
Finally, let me also say that, to a degree which I have found 
surprising, good lawyers are valued by the courts. Judges look forward 
to those cases where they know they will have the assistance of strong 
counsel. In this regard, I recently came across an article by former U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice and Nuremberg war crimes prosecutor Robert 
Jackson. He put it this way: 
 As I view the procession of lawyers who pass before the Supreme 
Court, I often am reminded of an old parable. Once upon a time three 
stone masons were asked, one after the other, what they were doing. 
The first, without looking up, answered, “earning my living”. The 
second replied, “I am shaping this stone to pattern”. The third lifted his 
eyes and said, “I am building a cathedral”. So it is with the men of the 
law at labour before the court. The attitude and preparation of some 
show they have no conception of their effort higher than to make a 
living. Others are dutiful but uninspired in trying to shape their little 
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cases to a winning pattern. But it lifts up the heart of a judge when an 
advocate stands at the bar who knows that he is building a cathedral.17 
That is grand language but I wholeheartedly agree with it. Skillful 
counsel are highly regarded. The fish respect and appreciate good 
fishermen. 
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